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I. INTRODUCTION
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicated the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.... The paramount destiny and mission
of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator.'
At English common law, a woman constructively forfeited her
identity because the law merged her identity with that of her husband
in marriage. Once married, she was unable to own property, enter
into contracts, or receive credit in her own name. She was totally
dependent on her husband for supplying the necessaries for daily liv-
ing. Courts developed the "doctrine of necessaries" to provide that a
husband who is derelict in providing food, clothing, shelter, and/or
medical services to his wife is liable to a third party who provides
these necessaries2 to the wife.3 However, because the wife was
thought legally incapable of incurring an obligation independent of
her husband and because the husband was legally, and exclusively,
responsible for providing the necessaries for the entire family unit, the
wife had no reciprocal liability to a third party to provide necessaries
to her husband.' The United States adopted the English common law
model of the marital relationship with its correlative duties after the
Revolution.5
The Married Woman's Property Acts and, eventually, various
state equal rights amendments and gender-neutral property and sup-
port laws fomented legal recognition in the United States of the
mutual interests of husbands and wives in property. In the early
1980s, the Florida district courts began to recognize the implausibility
of the antiquated role of women encoded in the doctrine of neces-
saries.6 The courts analyzed the burden of financial responsibility in
the marriage in light of a notion of equality of husband and wife.
These district courts held that the doctrine of necessaries had to be
either extended to apply reciprocally or abolished altogether.7 The
Florida Supreme Court, however, was not as willing as the district
courts to bring the laws of Florida into the twentieth century. In
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 U.S. (1 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
2. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
251 (1968).
3. In fact, the doctrine of necessaries also extends to the needs of the children. See, e.g.,
North Carolina Baptist Hosp. v. Franklin, 405 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991); Morris v.
Commonwealth, Dep't of Social Serv., 408 S.E. 2d 588 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Treatment of the
doctrine of necessaries as applied to children, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
4. See Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1986).
5. CLARK, supra note 2, at 251; see also 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 3-19 (Marlene S.
Wortman ed., 1985); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 1-14 (1985).
6. See infra part III.A.
7. See, e.g., Parkway Gen. Hosp. v. Stern, 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Manatee
Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith,8 the high court
held that the doctrine of necessaries was "a fixed rule of law" which
the court was powerless to alter in the absence of legislative action.
The court noted in its opinion that there was no equal protection
claim properly presented in Shands9 -and through this door, the dis-
trict courts once again began to usher in cases extending or abolishing
the doctrine of necessaries. More recently, the validity of the doctrine
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution,' 0 as well as under article I, section 2"
and article X, section 512 of the Florida Constitution of 1968, was
challenged in Waite v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center, Inc. 13 The
Florida Supreme Court, however, denied review of this case and per-
mitted the antiquated doctrine to remain untouched. This Comment
will outline the history of the doctrine of necessaries leading up to the
Shands decision and the various arguments for keeping the doctrine
intact, extending it to both spouses reciprocally, and for abolishing it
altogether. Application of the rational relation test used for equal
protection challenges to the doctrine will reveal that the court must
extend the doctrine to apply to both spouses and may do so in the
absence of a clear legislative mandate.
Extension of the doctrine of necessaries will reorder the protec-
tion of husbands, wives, and creditors. Husbands who are not the sole
breadwinners or are dependent upon their wives will no longer be
exclusively responsible for supplying necessaries to the household.
Wives will no longer have the defense of the doctrine of necessaries as
an absolute bar to creditors' claims for debts incurred for necessary
expenses. Extension will provide creditors a greater degree of security
in their transactions and eliminate the uncertainty that currently
8. 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
9. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
10. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among
which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to
be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property ....
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
12. "There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in the
holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal ... 
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
13. 582 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied 592 So. 2d 683 (1991).
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arises from the inconsistencies among the districts. Some fear that the
class that has traditionally benefitted from the doctrine-women-
will have its security blanket removed. At first glance, this may seem
a bitter pill to swallow for the sake of "women's rights." In the long
run, however, the failure to modify the doctrine will be more detri-
mental to women than the modification of the protection which the
doctrine provides.
The protection from creditors afforded by the doctrine of neces-
saries can be enhanced in a non-debilitating manner by holding each
spouse liable for the necessaries incurred by the other to the extent of
the proportion of their respective financial contributions to the mar-
riage partnership. Courts can apply the traditional principles of part-
nership law in accordance with the protective and support policies of
the doctrine of necessaries. These principles-the fiduciary duty, obli-
gations of fairness and full disclosure, duties of loyalty and good faith,
and imposition of liability upon each partner for expenses incurred by
the partnership-create a financial structure for the couple which dis-
courages lopsided spending and protects dependent spouses.
II. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES
The inferior legal status of women has been thought to be "natu-
ral or necessary or divinely ordained. . . .Courts classified women
with children and imbeciles, denying their capacity to think and act as
responsible adults and enclosing them in the bonds of protective
paternalism."' 4
A. Coverture and the Common Law
At English common law, a marriage merged the husband and
wife into one person. That is, the legal existence of the woman was
suspended during marriage. As a consequence of this loss of legal
identity, "[a] married woman.., cannot be bound personally beyond
her moral obligation ... [and can] incur no personal liability, because
by reason of coverture she is incapable of making any contract that
will so bind her."' 5 Once married, the husband assumed control of
the wife's personal property, including not only that owned before
marriage, but also any property acquired by her during the mar-
riage." He also acquired her personal earnings and her capacity to
14. Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872 (1971).
15. McQuaid v. Fontane, 5 So. 274, 276 (Fla. 1888).
16. CLARK, supra note 2, at 293.
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contract.' 7 The inability to contract prevented the wife from con-
tracting even for food, clothing, or medical needs. Under the com-
mon law, solely the husband bore the obligation to provide such
"necessaries" for the wife."8 If the husband failed to provide the
necessaries, the doctrine of necessaries allowed the wife to contract
for them without the husband's consent or joinder. The husband,
nevertheless, would be liable for the debt.' 9
B. Married Women's Property Acts
The Married Women's Property Acts, which state legislatures
enacted as early as the mid-nineteenth century,20 ostensibly promoted
the emancipation of women from the constraints of coverture. These
Acts provided women the right to enter into contracts and to acquire,
own, and transfer separate property.2' Once state legislatures passed
such Acts, the husband no longer had complete dominion over the
wife and lost the right to the control or possession of the wife's prop-
erty.2 2 The terms of the Acts did not subject the property to claims
against the husband.
Legislatures unevenly created these state statutes and private
laws involving married women's property.23 Although the Married
Women's Property Acts had the effect of giving a degree of emancipa-
tion from the constraints of coverture, the impetus for the reform
came not so much from a recognition of the equality of women as
from the need of the lawmakers to respond to tremendous market
pressures.24 The economic instability during the early nineteenth cen-
17. Id. at 287.
18. The wife had the obligation to provide household services to her husband and
contribute to the "domestic felicity," but the economic sphere belonged to the husband. See
infra note 138.
19. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430.
20. In 1839, Mississippi passed the first Married Women's Property Act. Most other
states enacted such acts by 1850. CLARK, supra note 2, at 322; see JOAN HOFF, LAW,
GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN app. 1 (1991); see also
NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982).
21. See LEILA J. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE (1890); RANSOM H.
TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY AND THE LAW OF COVERTURE (1873).
22. In Florida, coverture was voided in Merchant's Hostess Service of Florida v. Cain, 9
So. 2d 373 (1942). See generally HOFF, supra note 20 (discussing women's legal status in the
United States from pre-Revolutionary America through the demise of coverture and into the
present day); see also 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 5, at 117-21.
23. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
24. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 5, at 122; see also MALVINA HALBERSTAM
& ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO ERA? 8 n. 18 (1987); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law:
1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1400-04 (1983).
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tury25 compelled judges and legislators to seek ways to ease exchange
restrictions. The judges sought to foster economic growth while
avoiding undue hardship to families. Lawmakers helped serve this
goal by both narrowing dower rights, which impeded land develop-
ment, and by protecting the property of married women from credi-
tors through narrow interpretation of the property acts when the
economy worsened.26
While the Married Women's Property Acts reformed the legal
role of women, they did not mitigate the duty of the husband to pro-
vide support to the wife.27 Even the current Florida statute pertaining
to married women's rights states that it does not relieve a husband of
the duty to support his wife.28 The law of support between husband
and wife developed from the definition of marriage at common law
which constructed the role of the husband as the "head of household,
decisionmaker, and economic provider"29 and the role of the wife as
homemaker. Because the Married Women's Property Acts eased the
restraint on the wives' property, but did not alter the underlying defi-
nitions of the roles of support in the marriage, they had little affect on
the doctrine of necessaries.3 °
25. Eg., the Panic of 1837. See Chused, supra note 24, at 1359-84 (documenting the
economic and legal interrelationship).
26. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 5, at 117-21.
27. Robert Toews, The Doctrine of Necessaries & Wisconsin's Attempt to Modify the
Doctrine to Conform to the Equal Protection Clause, 1 LAW & INEQ. L. REV. 407, 414 (1983).
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 708.10 Married Women's Rights; construction of law
This law shall not be construed as:
(1) relieving a husband from any duty of supporting and maintaining his
wife and children;
(2) abolishing estates by the entireties or any of the incidents thereof;
(3) abolishing dower or any of the incidents thereof;... note 1: (1). .. is not
unconstitutionally discriminatory; the statute does not create a duty on the part
of the husband to support his wife and does not relieve a wife of any duty which
she may have to support her children.
29. Margaret M. Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage: Equal Protection,
Spousal Support, and the Doctrine of Necessaries, 22 J. FAM. L. 221, 225 (1983-84).
30. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife § 348 ("The liability of a husband for necessaries
furnished his wife is not generally affected by the... Married Women's Acts... because the
liability of the husband arises primarily from the marital relationship, and not from the fact
that at common law he was entitled to all his wife's personalty and the usufruct of her
realty."); see also Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property
Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts and State Legislatures,
29 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1 (1985) (finding that the need for more certain guidelines for creditors
and for minimizing incentives to hide assets were, at least, partially responsible for the creation
of the married women's property laws); Chused, supra note 24 (tracing the property rights of
women in the first half of the nineteenth century and concluding that the married women's
property laws were not a response to coverture as much as to the changing role of women in
relationship to raising children and the disposition of family wealth).
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C. Equal Rights Amendments
During the 1970s, the push for a national Equal Rights Amend-
ment and the adoption by several states of equal rights provisions and
amendments in their state constitutions3 1 accompanied a reinvigora-
tion of the criticism of the role of women in society and the law. A
national Equal Rights Amendment was promoted as a constitutional
basis from which changes in the American legal structure could be
made.32 Members of Congress introduced an Equal Rights Amend-
ment in every Congress from the 68th to the 92nd, but most of these
died in committee. By the early 1980s, opposition to the national
amendment appeared insurmountable and the movement died.33
Although Congress never passed a national Equal Rights
Amendment, some of the constitutional amendments adopted by indi-
vidual states were substantially the same as the proposed federal
amendment. 4 Other states passed provisions adding a dimension of
equality of men and women to their state constitutions or altered the
terms of their constitutions to a gender-neutral standard.3"
The Florida Constitution contains no specific equal rights
amendment or provision.36 It does, however, provide that all persons
31. Over a third of the states passed such provisions or amendments during the 1970s. See
generally ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST. art II, § 29; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20;
HAWAII CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 21; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD. CONST.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46; MASS. CONST. art. 1, § 4; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.H.
CONST. art. 2, pt. 1; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 3A; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WISC. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; Wyo.
CONST. art VI, § 1.
32. Brown et al., supra note 14, at 920-80 (the Equal Rights Amendment would have
prompted dramatic changes in the areas of protective labor legislation, domestic relations law,
criminal law, and the military).
33. In the face of opposition from the Republican Party, lack of cohesive support from the
Democrats, and opposition from special corporate interests, the National Organization for
Women formally announced in 1982 the end of the ERA Countdown Campaign. NAT'L
NOW TIMES, Aug. 1982, at 2-3. See generally MARY F. BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED (1986);
MARY A. DELSMAN, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT ERA (1975); RIGHTS OF
PASSAGE: THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF THE ERA (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986); GILBERT
Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY (1985).
34. State legislatures passed similar amendments in Pennsylvania (1971); Colorado,
Maryland, Texas, Washington (1972); New Mexico (1973); New Hampshire (1974);
Massachusetts (1976); and Hawaii (1978). See generally BERRY, supra note 33, at 86-10(
(outlining the changes in the courts and states in the 1970s, in the shadow of the ERA
campaign); J. RALPH LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB, THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 89-
107 (1988).
35. See supra note 31.
36. In 1978, Florida voters rejected the addition of the word "sex" to the second sentence
of Florida Statute article 1, section 2. The sentence would have then read, "[n]o person shall
be deprived of any right because of race, sex, or physical handicap." See Ruth L. Gokel, Note,
One Small Word. Sexual Equality Through the State Constitution, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 948
(1978).
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are equal before the law37 and that married women shall have the
same rights as married men in regard to holding, controlling, and dis-
posing of property. 38 As further evidence of the legislature's attempts
to provide for equal rights and abolish sex-stereotyping, in 1979, the
Florida legislature changed the terms "husband" and "wife" to
the gender-neutral terms "spouse" and "party" in the Florida
Constitution. 39
III. FLORIDA AND THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES
The Florida Supreme Court abolished the common law doctrine
of coverture in Merchant's Hostess Service of Florida v. Cain." In
Cain, a personal advertising business sued for an accounting on a con-
tract and for an injunction to prohibit the defendant husband and wife
from further breaching their contract with the advertising business.
The wife claimed that because she was a married woman, the defense
of coverture prevented the contract from being enforced against her.4'
The Florida Supreme Court responded that coverture, a "holdo-
ver" from the common law, no longer had a place in equity law. The
court premised its consideration of the doctrine on the notion that
husbands and wives are "partners and equals"42 in marriage. Because
the factors upon which coverture was predicated had disappeared, so
must coverture itself.43 This way, the wife could not enter a contract
and carry on business and then later employ the theory of coverture
to avoid her obligatioit. Although the Florida Supreme Court
expressly abolished coverture in Florida, the doctrine of necessaries
remained untouched. The Florida Supreme Court has upheld the
common law doctrine of necessaries as recently as 1986."1 Although
other states have departed from the common law doctrine when chal-
37. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
38. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.
39. See Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1980).
40. 9 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1942).
41. Id. at 374.
42. Id. at 375. The court vividly contrasted this notion of equality with the description of
the woman's role during coverture as a "chattel ... incapable of taking an education or
following a career," expected only to "thrill over ... accouchement and the kitchen" and with
the description of coverture itself as "the product of a period in which man was smeared with
the externals of a potential culture." Id.
43. Id. The lone dissenter argued that the court could not legislate, but could "only
interpret and apply the law as it actually exists." Id. at 376. This argument would reappear in
the 1980s when the doctrine of necessaries was challenged on equal protection grounds. See
infra part III.




lenged on equal protection grounds,45 the Florida Supreme Court has
yet to entertain a case challenging the doctrine on those grounds.
A. The District Courts' Approach
1. MANATEE AND PARKWAY
In Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald,46 a hospital
sought to hold a wife liable for expenses resulting from the hospitali-
zation of her husband. The Second District Court of Appeal of Flor-
ida agreed with the hospital that the movement of the law was, in fact,
toward equality of the sexes, despite the rejection by Florida voters of
a proposed Equal Rights Amendment and the absence of the word
"sex" in article 1, section 2 of the state constitution.47 Legislative
intent to ban gender bias from the laws of Florida, said the court,
derived from the legislature's then-recent purge from the divorce laws
of references to "husband" or "wife" (in favor of the gender-neutral
"spouse" or "party") and its adoption of reciprocal and complemen-
tary duties of support and maintenance.4" Furthermore, the court
recognized the flexibility of the law to change with the evolution of
society. The court extended the doctrine of necessaries, holding that a
wife is liable for the necessaries of the husband, as he is for hers. 9
The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida modified the doc-
trine of necessaries in Parkway General Hospital, Inc. v. Stern.50 The
court held a wife responsible for the necessaries-in this case, the cost
of hospitalization-of the husband solely because of the marital rela-
tionship. Relying on the rationale already enunciated by the Manatee
court, this district court reiterated that the modification of Florida
constitutional, statutory, and decisional law compelled its decision. 51
45. E.g., Medical Serv. Ass'n v. Perry, 819 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Jersey Shore
Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980). Other states have
modified or abolished the doctrine based on state equal rights amendments. See, e.g., Schilling
v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 303 S.E. 2d 905 (Va. 1983); Condore v. Prince
George's County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981); United States v. O'Neill, 478 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Pa. 1979); Albert Einstein Medical Ctr. v. Gold, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (1974).
46. 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
47. Id. at 1357; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
48. 392 So. 2d at 1357.
49. The district court made no reference to the relative assets or earning capacity of either
the husband or the wife in its opinion. The reciprocal and complementary duties of support
and maintenance announced by the court seemed to apply regardless of the actual finances of
each spouse. The court did, however, decline to decide whether the doctrine of necessaries
should be interpreted to mean that one spouse will be responsible for the necessaries of the
other only if the resources of the spouse who incurred the debt are insufficient to pay it. Id. at
1359 n.1.
50. 400 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
51. Id. at 167.
19921
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2. THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER STATES
The decisions of other states to abolish or extend the doctrine
strongly influenced the movement of the Florida district courts.52 For
example, in Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital v. Estate of
Baum,53 the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the doctrine of
necessaries to hold either spouse liable for the necessaries incurred by
the other. The court described the common law doctrine of neces-
saries as "an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary soci-
ety .... The common law must adapt to the progress of women in
achieving economic equality and to the mutual sharing of all obliga-
tions by husbands and wives."54
The court did not require absolute equality of the sexes as a pre-
requisite to altering the doctrine of necessaries. The court reasoned
that the statistics indicating the financial dependence of some wives
on their husbands was "insufficient reason" to leave the gender-based
classification undisturbed when balanced against a doctrine which
"denigrates the efforts of women who contribute to the finances of
their families and denies equal protection to husbands."55 By apply-
ing the doctrine in a gender-neutral fashion, the court recognized the
modem role of women in the workforce56 and in the marriage as an
integral part of a single financial unit. 7
In Memorial Hospital v. Hahaj,5 8 an Indiana district court altered
the doctrine of necessaries, making the spouse who incurs the debt for
necessaries primarily liable. If the property of that spouse proves
insufficient, then the financial resources of the marital relationship are
secondarily liable. This court noted that today's woman is "a differ-
52. The Manatee court considered Kurpiewski v. Kurpiewski, 386 A.2d 55 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1978) (finding a sex-neutral burden of support to exist in Pennsylvania after the passage of an
equal rights amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution) and Jersey Shore Medical Center-
Fitkin Hospital v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980) (doctrine of necessaries modified
to equalize the responsibility of each spouse for the necessaries of the other). The Florida
district court in Webb v. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, 521 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1988), also noted the decision in Jersey Shore as well as Wengler v. Druggist's Mutual
Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (statute providing work-related death benefits to widow
without requiring proof of her dependency on husband but requiring proof from a widower of
dependency on wife violates equal protection) and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(provisions granting survivor's benefits to widow regardless of dependency, but to widower
only if he was receiving half of his support from his deceased wife violates Due Process Clause
of Fifth Amendment).
53. 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980).
54. Id. at 1008-09.
55. Id. at 1008.
56. See infra note 129.
57. 417 A.2d at 1009.
58. 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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ent legal creature" 59 than the woman under coverture whom the doc-
trine of necessaries was designed to protect. The court also
recognized that the modem marital relationship is a partnership for
which the adoption of such a form of the doctrine of necessaries is
sensible, if not in accord with general notions of partnership
responsibility.'
Wisconsin extended the doctrine in the form of primary/secon-
dary liability in Marshfield Clinic v. Discher. 61 In this case the state's
highest court imposed primary liability upon the husband in all cases,
regardless of whether or not he was the spouse who incurred the nec-
essary expense.62 The court imposed a legal duty on the wife for the
support of the family, but the court limited this duty to amounts that
a creditor had first tried to collect from the husband, but which the
husband lacked resources to satisfy.63 The court reasoned that its
modification of the doctrine passed constitutional equal protection
scrutiny because, first, the liability scheme served several important
government objectives, including helping families obtain necessary
and important goods and services and enabling wives to obtain credit
more easily; 64 and second, the court viewed this formulation as sub-
stantially related to these goals. 65 The court did not want to impose
greater than secondary liability upon women until such time that
women "achieve greater equality with their husbands in terms of their
relative financial strength.166
The evolving role of women convinced the court to modify the
common law doctrine. The court quoted from the latest labor statis-
tics, which revealed the increasing number of working wives and their
overall contribution to income. 67 Although the court acknowledged
that the doctrine may need further modification in the future, the
court did not resolve the issue of whether such change should come
from the legislature or again from the courts.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland chose to abolish the doctrine
altogether in Condore v. Prince George's County.68 After detailing the
spousal support obligations from coverture through the Married
Women's Property Acts to the present day, the court decided that the
59. Id. at 414.
60. Id. at 415.
61. 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982).
62. Id. at 327.
63. Id. at 328; see also In Re Estate of Stromsted, 299 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. 1980).
64. Marshfield, 314 N.W. 2d at 328.
65. Id. at 331.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 329.
68. 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981).
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common law doctrine violated the prohibition against gender-based
discrimination in the state's Equal Rights Amendment. The court left
further policy decisions in the area to that state's legislature.
Around the country, courts considering the question of whether
to retain the doctrine of necessaries in its common law form were
deciding against it. The three cases from New Jersey, Indiana, and
Maryland illustrate the three options open for courts that consider the
doctrine of necessaries untenable in its original form. These influen-
tial cases all were decided before the Florida Supreme Court decision
in Shands.
B. The Florida Supreme Court's Resolution
1. SHANDS
As late as 1986, in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v.
Smith,69 the Florida Supreme Court declined to alter or abolish the
doctrine of necessaries, stating that such action particularly belonged
to the province of the legislature. Shands Hospital sued to recover the
unpaid balance of a bill from a widow who had not agreed in writing
to pay for the services rendered to her husband. The court recognized
the possibility of "instances where it would be inequitable to hold
either a wife or a husband liable for medical services rendered to a
spouse ... [or] not to hold either spouse liable."7  Nevertheless, the
court shied away from any modification of the common law rule,
arguing that "the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public
input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal
consensus."'" In so ruling, the court expressly disapproved the deci-
sions in Parkway and Manatee.72
This decision, which purports to act on behalf of family interests
to the detriment of the rights of the individual (woman), has been
characterized as part of a regressive movement by the courts. 73 Often,
protection of the individual is the justification for laws or doctrines
that inhibit individual rights.74 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court of California, in an influential opinion striking down a state
69. 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
70. Id. at 646 (footnote omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. This regression refers to the focus after the Middle Ages on the intrafamilial
obligations which have largely come to be replaced today by the concept of primacy of the
individual rights holder. See Lois G. FORER, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: WOMEN, CHILDREN,
AND THE ELDERLY IN COURT 41-44 (1991).
74. LINDGREN & TAUB, supra note 34, at 21-22.
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provision that prohibited the hiring of women as bartenders, has rec-
ognized that:
Laws which disable women from full participation in the political,
business, and economic arenas are often characterized as "protec-
tive" or beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or ethnic
minorities would readily be recognized as invidious and impermis-
sible. The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all
too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.75
2. EQUAL PROTECTION STANDING
The Florida Supreme Court did not completely close the door,
however, to any resolution by the courts of the viability of the doc-
trine. The Shands court was careful to note that the parties presented
no valid equal protection argument (because the hospital lacked
standing to sue on those grounds).76
The Shands decision included reference to Gates v. Foley. 7" As in
Shands, the argument was posed in Gates that any change in the com-
mon law should come from the legislature. 78 The Florida Supreme
Court in Gates nevertheless extended a cause of action for loss of con-
sortium to a wife on grounds of equal protection and certain gender-
neutralizing statutes.7 9 Mindful of the argument that alteration of the
common law should be left to the legislature, the Gates court asserted
that the law is not static but must evolve with changes in society. 80
"Legislative action could, of course, be taken, but we abdicate our
own function, in a field peculiarly non-statutory, when we refuse to
reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule."'"
C. The District Courts Divide
1. WEBB
Two years after the Florida Supreme Court issued the Shands
decision, a case challenging the doctrine of necessaries on equal pro-
tection grounds arose in the Second District. In Webb v. Hillsborough
75. Sai'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971).
76. 497 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1986); see also Medlock v. Fort Smith Serv. Fin. Corp., 803
S.W. 2d 930 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the assignee of a medical center lacked standing to sue
on equal protection grounds because the assignee neither suffered injury under the Fourteenth
Amendment nor belonged to the prejudiced class).
77. 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971).
78. Id. at 43.
79. Id. at 45.
80. Id. at 43.
81. Id.
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County Hospital Authority,8 2 a husband appealed from a final judg-
ment holding him liable, under the doctrine of necessaries, for the
hospital expenses incurred by his wife. The husband argued, recalling
the equal protection doorway left open in Shands and the court's hint
that courts have an obligation to reconsider outmoded court-made
rules, that the common law imposes no responsibility on the wife for
necessaries provided to her husband; therefore, he argued, he was not
liable for the necessaries provided to his wife absent any agreement
otherwise.8
3
The Second District was unwilling to abolish the doctrine of
necessaries, but did alter the doctrine by holding that both a husband
and wife are responsible for the necessaries provided to each. 4 The
court referred to the underlying equal protection rationale from Man-
atee and Parkway to support its decision.85 The district court distin-
guished the Florida Supreme Court's disapproval of those cases in
Shands, emphasizing that, in Webb, the husband did have standing to
raise an equal protection claim (unlike the hospitals which had tried
to raise it in the earlier cases). 86
The district court did place a condition precedent on the general
rule of liability: "In the absence of an agreement, the income and
property of one spouse should not be exposed to satisfy a debt
incurred by the other spouse unless the assets of the spouse who
incurred the debt are insufficient."'87 This limitation to secondary lia-
bility for the spouse who did not incur the expense protects the spouse
who did not expressly consent to the debt and assigns the burden of
proof to the creditor to show that the spouse who incurred the debt
lacks sufficient resources to satisfy the debt.8
The district court also addressed the argument posited in Shands
that the courts should leave to the legislature any change in the doc-
trine of necessaries.8 9 The court agreed with this principle in the
abstract, but argued that more persuasive reasons existed to make
changes pending future legislative action.90  When faced squarely
82. 521 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
83. Id. at 200-01.
84. Id. at 202.
85. Id. at 202-03.
86. Id. at 203.
87. Id. at 204 (quoting Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417
A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J. 1980)). Because the record from the court below did not indicate
whether the wife, in fact, had the ability to pay, the Second District remanded the case for
further proceedings.
88. Id.




with an equal protection challenge to the doctrine, the district court
stated that it had no choice but to hold that the doctrine does, in fact,
violate equal protection.91 Clearly, the court had the option to abol-
ish the doctrine. Rather than leave such a "hiatus" 92 in the law, the
court extended the doctrine to include both spouses.
2. NORTH SHORE
Only three months after the Second District Court of Appeal
decided Webb, the Third District Court of Appeal came to the same
conclusion. In North Shore Medical Center, Inc. v. Angrand,9a the
district court reversed a final judgment dismissing a suit against a hus-
band and wife for hospital services and supplies provided to the hus-
band. The court argued that because the husband admitted that he
could not pay the bill, "a judgment against his wife for the necessaries
provided to him should also be entered." 94 Despite the fact that the
plaintiff in this action was a hospital, which lacks standing to raise an
equal protection claim, the court relied on the rationale from Webb to
support its decision.
These two cases illustrate the tensions between the alternatives
once a court abrogates or reforms the doctrine. The constitutional
analysis of the underlying rationale of the doctrine of necessaries and
its traditional application as a support remedy solely for wives proves
violative of equal protection. The competing policy interests-sup-
port for needy wives versus equitable application of the law-are not
easily reconciled. Some state courts have, in fact, abolished the doc-
trine, thereby leaving any reformulation to the state legislature. Other
state courts choose to style a new doctrine themselves, while acknowl-
edging the province of the state legislature to make further changes in
spousal support remedies. 95
3. WAITE
Three years later, the Fifth District Court of Appeal came to a
different conclusion than that of the Second and Third Districts when
confronted with a similar equal protection challenge to the doctrine of
91. Id. at 207.
92. Id. at 205.
93. 527 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
94. On rehearing, the district court withdrew its direction to the trial court to enter
judgment against the husband and wife. It was brought to the court's attention that the
hospital had voluntarily dismissed its action against the wife during the pendency of the appeal
for rehearing. In light of this change, the district court ordered the judgment to be entered
against the husband alone. Id. at 247.
95. See infra part IV.C.2.
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necessaries. In Waite v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center,96 a medi-
cal center sued a patient and her husband to recover a debt owed for
medical services provided to the wife. The husband argued that any
liability on his part for medical services, without reciprocal liability
on her part, would violate equal protection. The district court held
that there was no violation of equal protection and that the husband
was responsible for the debt.97
The Waite court noted that it had considered and rejected such
an equal protection argument in Halifax Hospital Medical Center v.
Ryals.98 In Halifax, the Fifth District Court of Appeal acknowledged
that logic dictated that either both spouses or neither spouse should
be liable for the debts of the other. However, in the absence of legisla-
tive action, the court refused to alter the common law rule and
claimed that it was bound by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Shands.9 9 The district court resuscitated this argument in Waite and
expressed its reluctance to establish a fixed rule of law (by altering or
abolishing the common law) "when the issue is one of equity which
can only be determined based on the particular equities of a given
factual situation."'' °
The Waite decision was unsound for several reasons. First, the
husband, unlike the hospital in the Shands case, had standing to make
an equal protection challenge. The husband bore a burden not
imposed on the wife that constituted a sufficient personal stake in the
outcome."° ' In Shands, the Florida Supreme Court had particularly
foreseen confronting the equal protection challenge when it properly
arose 0 2 and had carefully noted the lack of standing of Shands Hospi-
tal as a reason for not permitting the equal protection rationale to
hinder the traditional application of the doctrine of necessaries.
The Waite court hesitated to decide this "broad public policy
96. 582 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1991).
97. Id. at 790.
98. 526 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Halifax also involved a hospital suing a
husband and wife for medical expenses incurred by the wife. The district court rejected the
trial court's equal protection analysis and held that the husband is financially responsible for
necessary expenses incurred by his wife. Id.
99. Id.
100. 582 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (quoting Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics,
Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1986)).
101. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979). In Orr, the Supreme Court considered state
alimony statutes under which husbands but not wives could be required to pay alimony on
divorce. The Court struck down the statutes on equal protection grounds and held that
although the goal of helping the needy spouse was a legitimate state objective, it was
inadequate to justify the sex-based classifications in the statutes when individual hearings were
already a part of the procedure for awarding alimony. Id. at 280-81.
102. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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question"'' 13 of whether to alter or abolish the common law doctrine
of necessaries in deference to the state legislature."° However, it can
also be argued that the court has a particular responsibility to decide
these issues because the doctrine is court-made 0 5 and because equal
protection is "one of the exceptions to the separation-of-powers doc-
trine [as an] area of constitutionally guaranteed or protected
rights." 10 6 The jurisdictional brief submitted to the Florida Supreme
Court by the appellants in Waite argued that altering the doctrine of
necessaries does not violate any principles of separation of power.
When the people have spoken through their organic law concern-
ing their basic rights, it is primarily the duty of the legislative body
to provide the ways and means of enforcing such rights; however,
in the absence of appropriate legislative action, it is the responsibil-
ity of the courts to do so. 107
Ultimately, the district court decision in Waite fails equal protection
scrutiny. 10 8
The clear difference in treatment of the doctrine of necessaries
among the district courts of appeal calls for a review of the doctrine of
necessaries under an equal protection analysis. The Florida Supreme
Court cannot simply ignore the constitutional ramifications of the
doctrine as the different Florida district courts of appeal currently
apply it.
103. Waite v. Leesburg Regional Medical Ctr., 582 So. 2d 789, 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
104. To illustrate, the Second District Court of Appeal defended its opinion in Webb at
length against any possible charges of reckless judicial activism. That court, which did alter
the doctrine of necessaries, approached the issues of the case with "legal realism" which
dictates that a court must make a "choice of law in this kind of case despite the sometimes
controversial nature of the general subject." Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp., 521 So. 2d
199, 206 n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The Webb decision emphasized the careful thought and
"reflection" which had gone into its decision. The court simply changed court-made rules for
reasons compelled by the United States Supreme Court and "Florida constitutional, statutory,
and decisional law." Id. (quoting Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Stern, 400 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981)).
105. See infra part IV.C.
106. Petitioners' Amended Brief on Jurisdiction at 9, Waite v. Leesburg Regional Medical
Ctr., Inc., 582 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (No. 90-02163) (quoting Dade County
Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972)).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (statute providing
worker's compensation benefits to widow without requiring proof of her dependency on
husband, but requiring widower to prove dependency on wife, violates equal protection); Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (statute authorizing alimony payments by husbands but not wives
violates equal protection); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (provisions of Social
Security Act granting survivor benefits to widow and child based on earnings of deceased
husband and father, but granting survivor benefits to children but not widower based on
earnings of deceased mother, violates equal protection); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (a
mandatory preference for men over women as administrators of estates violates equal
protection).
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION APPLIED
The Florida Supreme Court °9 and the United States Supreme
Court" 0 have upheld sex-based classifications where the bias was sub-
stantially related to important state objectives. Absent such state
objectives, however, the classification must fail."' Moreover, often
sexual classifications are not the product of rational legislative
thought, but only "the perpetuation of a stereotyped attitude. 1" 2
Courts that have altered or abolished the doctrine of necessaries have
all referred to the policy of protecting needy women as an important
and necessary consideration, but have, nonetheless, refused to leave
the outmoded doctrine untouched. Courts can no longer justify abso-
lute deference to a notion of all women as a uniform class of financial
dependents today.
A. Sex-Based Classifications and the Judiciary
1. THE STANDARD OF SCRUTINY
Reed v. Reed 113 was the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a legislative classification based on sex.
Reed presented the question whether a state statute giving men a pref-
erence over women as administrators of a decedent's estate was
rationally related to the state's objective of reducing the workload of
probate courts.' Under the guise of application of rational-basis
scrutiny' '1 the Court held that the statute did not operate as a reason-
able means of reducing the workload of probate courts. In striking
109. In re Estate of Rincon, 327 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. 1976) (upholding dower and curtesy
statute's differing treatment of widows and widowers on the grounds of men's and women's
"disparat[e] .. .economic capabilities").
110. In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a property tax
exemption for widows but not widowers on the basis that the alleged governmental objective
was one of compensating for past discrimination against women. For criticism that Kahn does
not withstand the constitutional test formulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Craig
requires a court to evaluate the actual reasons prompting enactment of the challenged law and
not any reason that may by proffered as justification for the rule or statute at the time of the
challenge), see Leo Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1388-91 (1980) [hereinafter "Benign" Sex Discrimination]; Nancy S.
Erickson, Equality Between the Sexes in the 1980's, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 591, 599-600 (1979).
111. See infra notes 113-123 and accompanying text.
112. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, at 213 n.5 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally
FORER, supra note 73.
113. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
114. Id. at 76.
115. To meet a rational basis scrutiny test, the classification scheme need only be shown to
have a rational relationship to the legislative objective. The Supreme Court has shown extreme
deference to legislative choices under this test. Although the court purported to use a rational
basis test, the test used was actually more strict. Kanowitz, supra note 110, at 1381-82 (1980).
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down the statute, the Court argued that the mandatory preference for
males as administrators violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,' " 6 a plurality of the Court agreed that
gender-based classifications were inherently suspect. In Frontiero, a
married woman sought the same employment benefits as a married
man in the uniformed services. The government had been denying
the benefits to female employees on the basis of administrative con-
venience. The Court based its approach on the "long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination" in this country, the high visibility of
sexual distinctions, and the fact that sex frequently bears no relation
to job performance." 7 Justice Brennan argued in Frontiero that sex
has suspect status because
the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to per-
form or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions
between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members.'"
A majority of the Court finally settled on a test of intermediate
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren "9 in which the Court invalidated an
Oklahoma statute which permitted women to purchase 3.2% beer at
age eighteen while requiring men to wait until age 21. The Court
defined the new test as requiring gender classifications to "serve
important governmental objectives and ... be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives."' 20 Where the state can achieve its
purpose by a gender-neutral statute, the sex-linked classification has
been abolished' 2' or modified to apply equally to both sexes.' 22
The rule pronounced in Craig places the original purpose of the
law in the balance to be weighed against the state objective. The orig-
inal purpose of the doctrine of necessaries was to permit the wife who
lacked any contractual capacity of her own because of coverture to
116. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
117. Id. at 684-87.
118. Id. at 686-87.
119. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
120. Id. at 197.
121. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
122. See, e.g., Richland Memorial Hosp. v. Burton, 318 S.E. 2d 12 (S.C. 1984); Marshfield
Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W. 2d 326, 328 (Wis. 1982); Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp.
v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J. 1980).
The Court has, however, upheld a gender-based classification on the grounds that it was
rationally related to the end of compensating for past gender discrimination. Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida statute granting widows, but not widowers, a $500 property tax
exemption because of the disproportionate financial difficulties of widows).
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procure necessaries in absence of their supply by the husband.' 2 3 The
intermediate scrutiny equal protection test illuminates the problem of
the relation of the gender-biased means to the achievement of those
ends. Although a rule does not necessarily violate equal protection
simply because it discriminates against a class of persons, the doctrine
of necessaries fails intermediate scrutiny because its original purpose
is not well-tailored to the government's ends.
2. LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIONS
In cases involving the doctrine of necessaries, an analysis of the
legislative objective is initially problematic because this is a common
law doctrine, not a legislative enactment. The courts have altered or
abolished other gender-based laws, many of which, like the doctrine
of necessaries, stemmed from the theory of coverture, in the absence
of legislative action in the area. For example, courts have abolished
or extended actions for loss of consortium, sex-based differences in
sentencing for the same crime, and minimum wages for women only,
to apply to both sexes equally based solely on constitutional principles
of equality, without regard for the policy views (favoring retention of
the bias) of state and federal lawmakers. 124 The courts created the
common law doctrine and courts can abolish or alter the same.
Not all courts willingly take such an affirmative role in molding
the law.1 25 In decisions retaining the common law doctrine of neces-
saries, some courts say that such policy choices are properly the prov-
ince of the representative branch. 126 Other courts have emphasized
the goals of promoting "domestic harmony" and public welfare.
1 27
Authors have argued that the rule should be retained for the protec-
tion of the "needy" wife. 2 ' Where the rule affects all women, regard-
less of actual financial status, modern economic and social realities
reveal this rationale as impacting too broadly.
Statistically, it is true that despite the increase in number of
123. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
124. See LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 149-96 (1969).
125. E.g. Schilling v. Bedford Hosp. 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983) (abolishing the doctrine of
necessaries on equal protection grounds under intermediate scrutiny but refusing to extend the
doctrine, as in Condore, on the grounds that the legislature was the proper body to do so);
Condore v. Prince George's County, 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981) (abolishing the doctrine of
necessaries in light of the state's equal rights amendment, but refusing to extend the doctrine
on the grounds that the legislature was more fit to address the matter).
126. See Medlock v. Fort Smith Serv. Fin., 803 S.W.2d 930 (Ark. 1991); Shands Teaching
Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986).
127. E.g., Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
128. See Karol Williams, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary Application as a
Support Remedy, 19 STETSON L. REV. 661 (1990).
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women in the workforce, women still contribute less to the average
family income than their male counterparts. 129 The statistical likeli-
hood that a wife will be financially dependent on the husband does
not justify a presumption by courts in all necessaries cases that the
wife is, in fact, financially dependent. a1 3  This reasoning discriminates
against those men who provide an equal financial contribution to the
marriage and those who are financially dependent upon their wives.13 1
In Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 132 the Supreme Court
held that such gender-based discrimination, which is traditionally jus-
tified by the "assertion that most women are dependent on male wage
earners and that it is more efficient to presume dependence in the case
of women than to engage in case-to-case determination [,] ... fails...
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause."'
133
Furthermore, if the extension of liability to encompass the depen-
dent spouse's resources did create undue hardship for families, the
129. The rate of participation by women in the American labor force has risen steadily since
1870. By 1890, women comprised about 17% of the labor force and 14% of those women
were married. Chused, supra note 30, at 34 n. 118 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE
STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
129-34 (1976)). By 1970, 40% of women worked outside the home. 151 DAILY LABOR
REPORT, ECONOMIC SECTION, Employment: One in Ten Families Faced Unemployment
During Second-Quarter 1992, BLS Report, Aug. 5, 1992 at B-1. That percentage rose to 55%
in 1985 and 60% in 1990. Id. By the second quarter of 1992, 10.6 million married-couple
families relied on the husband as the sole wage-earner, while 25.9 million married-couple
families have both the husband and wife working. 208 DAILY LABOR REPORT, CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS SECTION, Speakers Issue "Wake-Up Call" to Employers, Workers, on
Workforce Quality, Oct. 26, 1990 at A-13. The income from these women contribute to the
basic support of the family. These numbers will continue to grow as women who were never
expected, much less encouraged, to develop labor market skills and never entered the
marketplace are replaced by women with higher levels of education and training and
expectations of jobs and careers.
Along with the increase in the employment rate, there has been a decrease in the birth
rate. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistics at a Glance, § 3 (Nov. 10,
1992). Martin O'Connell, Maternity Leave Arrangements: 1961-85 in WORK AND FAMILY
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN WOMEN, Series P-23, No. 165 (1990). For those women who are
having children, the likelihood of leaving the job force permanently has dropped and less time
is being taken from work by those who return. Id. Employers are becoming more generous in
parental leave. Other women are not dropping out of the work force at all. Id. These
statistics indicate that the traditional roles of husband and wife and the economic patterns they
produced no longer hold true.
130. The realizations that both spouses contribute to the marriage and that women are not
or need not be financially dependent upon their husbands are consistent with developments
such as rehabilitative alimony, equitable distribution of property, and enforcement of
antenuptial agreements. See Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice,
and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 498-501, 511-
19 (1987).
131. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher 314 N.W.2d 326, 337-338 (Wis. 1982) (Abrahamson,
J. dissenting).
132. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
133. Id. at 151-52.
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legislature could enact rules (prompted by economic reality) to limit
the extent of creditor access to the family's resources. 134  This
approach reserves to the legislature its authority to create laws for the
protection of needy persons while allowing courts to carry out their
role as enforcers of constitutional principles.
B. Impact of the Doctrine on Women
The doctrine of necessaries does not exist in a vacuum. It
responds to the problems of some women while simultaneously creat-
ing problems for others. By retaining the doctrine of necessaries, the
Florida Supreme Court has frozen in time the role of women. This,
perhaps, is a longing for a return to a mythical past that will not
suffice for the needs of the modem family or the capabilities of the
modem woman.
1. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EFFECTS
One reason for the hesitation of the courts to reform the doctrine
of necessaries stems from the doctrine's seeming current viability.
The original purpose of aiding dependent wives whose husbands fail
to supply them with the most basic means of living is no less salutary
or necessary today. In fact, a broader utilization of the doctrine has
been proposed as a supplement to current statutory support
provisions.135
A closer analysis of the rationale for the doctrine reveals that
although the doctrine of necessaries may appear necessary, the doc-
trine actually no longer remains a well-defined remedy. Not all
women fall in the category of those who require this financially pro-
tective doctrine, 136 nor do all men serve the function of sole pro-
vider. 137  By protecting women unilaterally, the courts send the
message that all women are intrinsically incapable of functioning or
attaining the capacity to function adequately in the economic
134. Brown et al., supra note 14, at 946.
135. Williams, supra note 128 (arguing that needy wives should actively procure necessary
expenses other than hospital costs, including food, clothing, and needs for children, and then
have the creditor collect payment from the husband). But see Mahoney, supra note 29, at 238
(explaining that "[t]he traditional scholarly wisdom had been that courts have so limited the
scope of the doctrine that few merchants would wish to rely on it" (citation omitted)).
136. This idea that compensatory protection serves as a "smokescreen" for an economic
inequality was seen earlier in the context of the struggle for various equal rights amendments.
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
137. In post-industrial society, married couples increasingly need the second income of the
wife in order to sustain their standard of living.
For a thought-provoking "sociological scrutiny" of the rise and fall of the "modem
family," see JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES (1990).
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realm.13 The rule as it stands is overbroad. Surely, men and women
are not yet socially or economically equal. 3 9 However, the same doc-
trine which shields disadvantaged women pins them in a traditional
submissive role. The doctrine of necessaries remains part of the very
baggage that women must cast off in order to claim their right as
equals in marriage and before the eyes of society. The protective ben-
efits of the doctrine of necessaries could still be retained while modify-
ing the rule to comply with the demands of equal protection. t
4°
Regardless of the ideality of the proposed reforms, "[t]here are
many who consider this to be impossible, given the status of men and
women in society; each comes to the marriage with certain political,
138. While no one would claim that the law was responsible for the traditional
division of labor in the family, it did serve to sanction and reinforce traditional
family roles.... For example, by promising housewives lifelong support, the law
created disincentives for women to develop their economic capacity and to work
in the paid labor force. In addition, by making them responsible for domestic
services and child care, it reinforced the primacy of these activities in their lives,
leaving them with neither the time nor the motivation to develop careers outside
the home.
WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 2; see also Lauerman, supra note 130, at 507.
Studies of the socialization of women indicate that females are faced throughout their
lives with the choice of being either "female" or "competent." For example, the same work
product, when attributed to a man, is rated higher by both men and women than when it is
attributed to a woman; both men and women consider "masculine" traits, such as being
aggressive and achievement oriented, desirable when exhibited by an man but "undesirable"
when exhibited by women. Meredith M. Kimball, Socialization of Women: A Study in Con-
flict, in MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND SOCIETY 189 (S. Parvez. Wakil ed., 1975).
139. In the fourth quarter of 1991, women who worked full time had median earnings of
$373/week compared to $503/week for men who worked full time. 24 DAILY LABOR
REPORT, Weekly Earnings Increased 3.3 Percent for Wage, Salary Workers in 1991, Feb. 5,
1992 at B-4.
The gender-gap in wages appears to be closing. During the 1980s, the gender-gap in
wages decreased by 10.5%. Id. However, commentators have argued that such change is
attributable to falling wages for men rather than rising wages for women, 174 DAILY LABOR
REPORT, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS SECTION, Erosion of Real Wages Spreads to White-Collar
Job Categories, Sept. 8, 1992 at A-l, and that, world-wide, gains in women's pay have been
slim, 174 DAILY LABOR REPORT, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS SECTION, ILO Study Finds Few
Gains for Women in Global Workforce; Decline Projected, Sept. 8, 1992 at A-5.
Although 76% of those questioned in a national survey of registered voters favored an
equal employment policy, 70 DAILY LABOR REPORT, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS SECTION,
Most Support Pay Equity, Survey Says, Apr. 10, 1992 at A-17, and such a policy should be
most advantageous to "younger, better educated, more highly qualified women," Paul Weiler,
The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986).
In fact, "[y]ounger women are nearly as segregated into traditional female jobs as middle-aged
and older women, and the gap between the wages paid to young women and young men is
likely to grow as they age." 90 DAILY LABOR REPORT, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS SECTION,
Job Segregation Between Sexes Does Not Decrease for Younger Women, Study Says, May 9,
1991 at A-2.
140. Lauerman, supra note 130, at 507 (arguing that the concept of equality of husbands
and wives demands that equals be treated equally and those who are not equal should be
treated differently to a degree consistent with their dissimilar positions).
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social, and economic baggage, and combining unequals will rarely
produce an equal partnership." 14' Others are willing to go half-way,
that is, to alter the doctrine to impose secondary liability upon the
wife, but retaining the primary liability of the husband.' 42  This
approach recognizes that at least some women contribute to the
household income, but denies recognition of the discriminatory affect
of the doctrine of necessaries upon at least some men. This Comment
does not ignore economic realities. 14 3 Indeed, the most responsive
formulation to economic reality is not to have a doctrine which
responds to any statistical formulation of economic dependency at all,
but rather one which applies according to the facts of a particular
case.
The underlying rationale of the doctrine of necessaries, which
purports to "protect" women, actually increases their vulnerability.
"[S]ocial and legal stereotypes are complexly interrelated and mutu-
ally reinforcing." 14 The model of the "needy wife" becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. 4 5 The stereotype of the husband as the sole
breadwinner and the wife as the homemaker leaves the wife at the
financial mercy of her husband. Because society assumes that wives
will be able to turn to their husbands for financial aid, women's indi-
vidual financial autonomy is restricted and they often fail to develop
critical financial skills. 146
Lenore Weitzman analyzed the extensive impact on women of
the social and economic consequences of the common law assump-
tions. Weitzman describes the economic effects as hindering women's
opportunity to develop personal, educational, and practical skills nec-
essary for financial independence and competence; devaluing the
actual contribution of the wife to the community support; and ignor-
141. KAREN DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE 179 (1974); see also Lauerman supra note 130, at
507.
142. See, e.g., Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982).
143. See supra note 129.
144. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 54 (1981).
145. Id. The New York Supreme court addressed the "threatening effect to female equality
of 'benevolent legislation' " when interpreting a statute that permitted payment of alimony to
women but not to men. Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 339 (1977). In Thaler, the court
argued that the discriminatory statute, while purporting to relieve economic discrimination
against women, may actually have fostered it.
Society created its classical concept of woman, and cast it in law. Women were
helpless and delicate, incapable of conducting worldly commerce, and too dainty
to be soiled by it. Directives which ... shelter women from the responsibilities
men are obliged to assume .. .are offensive. One woman's shelter is another's
trap, and perhaps her own later on.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
146. WEITZMAN, supra note 144, at 54-55.
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ing the real value of the wife's unpaid services. 147 Furthermore, the
social impact fosters women's self-identity as dependents, incapable of
effectively and productively functioning outside of the home. 4 ' Arti-
ficial social role constructs for men and women, premised on the
notion that women are passive homemakers and caregivers and men
are the breadwinners and protectors, 149 leave those whose individual
capacities and goals do not comport with these constructs "burdened
... with feelings of guilt, despair, and inadequacy."'' 10
Therefore, the disadvantages that the assumptions underlying the
doctrine of necessaries impute to women as a class-and that perpetu-
ate the characteristics that prevent courts from abolishing the doc-
trine--outweigh the advantages of the "band-aid" type effects of a
rule which may aid women in need.
2. CREDITOR EXPECTATIONS
Creditors currently face uncertainty when extending credit to
147. Id. at 53-59. Both in the United States and abroad, the value of women's housework is
gaining recognition. Some want to add "housework" to the gross national product-the
standard measure of the goods and services produced in a country. This would emphasize and
heighten the status of the work and the women who perform it. In October 1991, Rep.
Barbara-Rose Collins, D-Detroit, introduced a bill to an Education and Labor subcommittee
that would require the Bureau of Labor Statistics to value unpaid services which would then be
included in the GNP. Unpaid services include "housework, caring for children or the elderly,
agricultural work, volunteer work and work in a family business." H.R. 3625, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); Maria Odum, Legislator Wants to Put a Price on Housework, DET. FREE PRESS,
Apr. 8, 1992, at 4E.
Housework contributes an estimated $4 trillion to the world economy each year. Stu
Silverstein & Julie Rose, Valuing Housework as a Way to Help Women, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24,
1992, at D2. The value placed on the work done by women in this country is $16,000 per
woman, per year. Odum, supra.
148. WEITZMAN, supra note 144, at 56-59. Weitzman argues that women become
enormously disillusioned and resentful if or when they reevaluate their roles in the marriage
and in society. When a women redefines herself as an individual, rather than as her husband's
wife, she may feel void of personal identity. "As one woman explained: 'He was achieving,
developing, thriving.... I was losing my identity.... My life was defined by him, by his job,
his salary, his everything." Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
Weitzman also points out that it is not women alone who suffer from the constraints of
traditional roles. Husbands also have excessive pressure to be the sole income-producer.
Furthermore, husbands are discouraged from assuming greater responsibilities in the home
because employers "are more likely to expect them to be totally available for work." Id. at 80;
see also DECROW, supra note 141, at 156-84; KANOWITZ, supra note 124, at 198-99.
149. [T]here are biological differences between men and women in relation to
reproduction. [But] these differences have been used to justify sex-based legal
and cultural limitations on human potential that do not reflect any real difference
between men and women and that enforce the inferiority of women and the
dominance of men.
HOFF, supra note 20, at 363 (quoting attorneys Sylvia Law and Stephanie Wildman).
150. LEO KANOWITZ, EQUAL RIGHTS: THE MALE STAKE 15 (1981); see also LINDGREN
& TAUB, supra note 34, at 1-38.
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married women for several reasons. First, no hard and fast rule exists
for determining what qualifies as a "necessary."1 ' Second, though a
wife may have substantial personal financial means, if she lives in a
jurisdiction that abides by the old common law rule, the creditor may
be unpleasantly surprised that it can seek payment only from the hus-
band.' 52 Third, the different approaches among the district courts of
appeal in Florida are confusing and may make creditors hesitate to
extend any credit at all. The rule as it stands does not constitute a
well-defined remedy. 15 3
The Webb court considered the creditor's burden when modify-
ing the doctrine of necessaries. The court placed the burden of plead-
ing and proof on the creditor to show that the spouse to whom it
provided the necessaries cannot pay as a condition precedent to
imposing liability on the other spouse. 5 4 The court considered the
argument that the spouse seeking to avoid liability should bear the
burden of proving that the other spouse who received the necessaries
has the ability to pay. This formulation is advantageous because the
spouse knows the financial capacity of the other spouse better than
the creditor.
The Webb court rejected this argument, though, because shifting
the burden of proof to the creditor provides "some protection to the
spouse who has not expressly consented to the debt" '  and because
151. The general rule has been described as "such things as are necessary.., in accordance
with the means of the husband and social station of the family." Phillips v. Sanchez 17 So.
363, 364 (Fla. 1895) (holding that domestic servants were a necessary). Courts have held a
myriad of other items to be necessaries: Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497
So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1986) (medical care); Jordan Marsh v. Cohen, 136 N.E. 2d 350 (Mass. 1922)
(furniture and household goods); Feiner v. Boynton, 62 A. 420 (N.J. 1905) (clothing); Gimble
Bros. v. Pinto, 125 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1958) (mink coat); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 107 S.E. 704 (Va.
1921) (food). While parties in Florida have used the doctrine exclusively for medical costs, no
limitations on the use of the doctrine exist. Indeed, some advocate wider use of the doctrine to
encompass a wider array of necessary expenses.
152. The Jersey Shore court addressed this issue, which arose while the doctrine of
necessaries remained unmodified from the traditional common law rule, saying that under the
common law rule, "even a husband who is economically dependent on his wife would be liable
for the necessary expenses of both spouses, while the wife would not be liable for either."
Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008 (N.J. 1980).
The Jersey Shore court eventually decided that the doctrine can hold either spouse liable for
the necessaries of the other. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
153. Examples of paralyzing confusion for creditors are easily imagined. A state-wide
health-care organization would have administrative obstacles from operation to operation
across district lines. A patient admitted to one hospital may need to be rushed to another
hospital in a different district for emergency specialized care. These problems would be
obviated by a uniform policy that would facilitate creditor satisfaction.
154. Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199, 204 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
(following Jersey Shore).
155. Id. (quoting from Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d at 1010).
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"it would be unfair to accord the same rights to a creditor who pro-
vides necessaries on the basis of an agreement with one spouse as to a
creditor who has an agreement with both spouses."' 56 The creditor
also has the opportunity to investigate the financial status of the
spouse at the time it provides the necessaries. Moreover, the court
believed that placing the burden of proof on the spouse who did not
incur the debt would "promote marital disharmony."1 57
One Kansas court recently provided relief for a creditor by
extending the doctrine of necessaries to apply to both husbands and
wives."' The appellate court rejected the wife's contention that the
doctrine should not apply because her theory stemmed from the out-
dated notion of "unity of marriage."'' 9 Rather, the court found that
the doctrine arose from agency theory, according to which either
spouse has a legal obligation to provide the other with "everything
necessary for their mutual comfort and enjoyment."'" The creditor
could look to either spouse for payment of a debt incurred by one.16 '
Parties have invoked the doctrine of necessaries in Florida exclu-
sively in cases regarding the payment of hospital expenses. 62 Unlike
more frivolous cases such as that in which a mink coat was found by a
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. St. Francis Regional Medical Ctr. v. Bowles, 823 P.2d 226, 228 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
159. In fact, the concept of unity of marriage was expressly abolished in Kansas in 1927.
Id.
160. Id. (citing Harttmann v. Tegart, 12 Kan. 177 (1873)).
161. The opinion expressly eschewed any policy motivations for the equal application of the
doctrine. Id. at 228. The appellate court left the task of establishing a stated policy of gender-
neutralization to the state's highest court or to the legislature. It is interesting that this court
stated that a gender-neutral policy was particularly within the province of the judicial branch
and, only secondarily, within the province of the legislature. Cf Medlock v. Fort Smith Serv.
Fin. Corp., 803 S.W.2d 930, 931 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the legislature, not the judiciary
should decide whether duties under the doctrine of necessaries should be extended to the wife).
However, in Shands, the Florida Supreme Court held that because the legislature was in a
better position to study the issue, the legislature should resolve the issue. Shands Teaching
Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So. 2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1986). Obviously, this allocation of
policy formulation solely to the province of the legislature is not completely unfounded-
especially where the legislature is slow to act with what might be considered an impolitic
decision. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
162. There have been no cases reported in Florida in the past 50 years in which the doctrine
of necessaries was invoked for liabilities other than hospital expenses. During this time, the
doctrine has been invoked by parties in other states: Boulder County Dep't of Social Serv. v.
Harkreader, 791 P.2d 649 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (child care costs); Hudson v. Butane Gas
Corp., No. 83-249 1984 WL 1733 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (for contracts for the purchase of
furniture); Johnson v. Johnson, 811 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (nursing home costs);
Darmanin v. Darmanin, 540 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (attorneys fees);
Lichtman v. Grossbard, 537 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. 1988) (nursing home costs). See also supra
note 151.
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court to be a "necessary" ' 163 or where the parties invoke judicial
resources to settle a "family squabble,"' 64 the doctrine of necessaries
can be an effective and expedient means of allowing persons to receive
medical care without the potentially fatal delay of paperwork which
the creditor might require in the absence of the doctrine. The doc-
trine of necessaries has the further potential for lending the couple or
family in Florida a degree of assistance in obtaining other necessaries.
But the doctrine as currently enforced in Florida ill-fits the needs of
those it protects-both women and creditors.
C. Extension Versus Abolition of the Doctrine
If a court finds the doctrine of necessaries no longer retains via-
bility, it has two options. It can extend the protection of the rule to
both spouses-by making them either jointly 165 or primarily/seconda-
rily liable166-- or it can abolish the doctrine altogether.
1. ABOLITION
Abolition of the doctrine allows women freedom to contract for
or out of liability. 167 In the absence of such an agreement or the com-
mon law doctrine of necessaries, each spouse has personal liability for
his or her own expenses and debts. States such as Maryland, Virginia,
and Alabama have reevaluated the role of the doctrine of necessaries
and decided, rather than extending the doctrine, to abolish it alto-
gether. The Court of Appeals of Maryland chose to satisfy the man-
dates of that state's Equal Rights Amendment by abolishing the
doctrine of necessaries in Condore v. Prince George's County.168 The
court recognized the legislature's prerogative in the field but noted
163. Gimble Bros. v. Pinto, 125 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958).
164. See Note: The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1767, 1784
(1984).
165. Cooke v. Adams 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966) (holding both spouses jointly liable);
accord Jermunson v. Jermunson 592 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1979); Daggett v. Neiman-Marcus Co.
348 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
166. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj 430 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that the spouse incurring the medical expenses, whether husband or wife, is primarily liable
and the other is secondarily liable); Busch v. Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377, 401-02
(Minn. 1977) (expressing the view that the wife is primarily liable for her necessaries and the
husband only secondarily liable by virtue of state statute); accord Marshfield Clinic v. Discher,
314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982).
167. Traditionally, couples were not permitted during the marriage to alter the terms of
support contractually because of the "interests of society and the public welfare in maintaining
unimpaired the integrity of the marriage and its essential obligations." French v. McAnarney,
195 N.E. 714, 716 (Mass. 1935); see also 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW, supra note 5, at 32-
33. Courts have also generally abandoned this rule and will now enforce such agreements.
See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970).
168. 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981).
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that the common law "is also subject to change by judicial decision
where the Court finds.., that the common law rule is a vestige of the
past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people."' 69 Either
abrogation or extension of the doctrine by the court could have satis-
fied the terms of the state's Equal Rights Amendment. 7 ' However,
this court denied any role as policymaker. Pending consideration by
the legislature, the court abolished the doctrine.
Virginia abolished the doctrine in Schilling v. Bedford County
Memorial Hospital.'7' In Schilling, a hospital sued a husband for
medical services rendered to his wife. The wife had signed promissory
notes each of the four times that she had checked into the hospital. 72
Despite the husband's refusal to obligate himself for the wife's hospi-
tal expenses, the hospital recorded his name on their paperwork as
"guarantor."'' 73 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the doc-
trine of necessaries, with its gender-based classification, does not sub-
stantially relate to the state's interest in promoting prompt and
efficient medical care and, therefore, fails equal protection analysis.174
The court did not, however, modify the doctrine because it concluded
that such a task was better left to the legislature. 75
Recently, in Emanuel v. McGriff,176 the Alabama Supreme Court
considered the doctrine of necessaries and found that the state legisla-
ture had already "solve[d] the constitutional problem.' 77 The dis-
similar treatment for men and women, the court noted, clearly
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 78 The court then summarily
stated that the purpose of the doctrine did not substantially relate to
important government interests.179 The state statute provided that
each spouse was solely liable for their own debts and contracts. 80
169. Id. at 1018.
170. Id.
171. 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983).
172. Id. at 906.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 907-08.
175. Id. at 908.
176. 596 So. 2d 578 (Ala. 1992).
177. Id. at 579.
178. Id. at 579-80 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)).
179. Id. at 580.
180. The statute provides:
The husband is not liable for the debts or engagements of the wife, contracted or
entered into after marriage, or for her torts in the commission of which he does
not participate, but the wife is liable for such debts or engagements, or for her
torts, and is suable therefor as if she were sole.
ALA. CODE § 30-4-7 (1975).
In this case, the husband had actually signed a promissory note for the debt owed to the
hospital for the care of his deceased wife. The husband had been paying the hospital in $20
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The court rejected the plaintiffs request to resolve the constitutional
rub by applying the support doctrine equally to both spouses.' Such
action was thought to be within the particular province of the
legislature. 182
2. EXTENSION
Extension of the doctrine, some argue, may achieve equality with
a vengeance by creating liability in each spouse for debts of the
other.8 3  Such equality of rights should not be viewed as a brutal
form of equality which leaves women unprotected.'84 First, extension
would obviate the equal protection problem with the doctrine as it
currently stands in Florida. Second, extension does not necessarily
mean joint and several liability. Extension can be tailored according
to the relative financial contributions of the spouses, with each spouse
paying a proportionate share. Finally, creditors could have a greater
degree of security if allowed to reach the assets of either or both
spouses. Extending the doctrine to include both spouses would also
satisfy the equal protection requirement of a rational relationship
between the sex-based classification and the state objective.1 85
Joint and several liability would, in many cases, prove to be
equality with a vengeance. However, the vengeance is ameliorated if
the doctrine extends to both spouses in the form of liability on the
part of both spouses for the necessary expense of either spouse, in the
proportion to which each financially contributes to the marriage.
Because the modified doctrine would not impose financial liability to a
greater extent than the financial proportion each spouse contributes,
the doctrine would not unfairly strain the resources of a spouse who
contributes more household services and less monetary income. This
allows courts to take a case-by-case look at the actual income contri-
and $25 increments for seven months after his wife died. He then ceased payments and died
less than a year later. The hospital filed a claim against the estate. Although the majority
opinion makes little of this promissory note, a special concurrence might have found this a
dispositive factor. Nevertheless, because the hospital chose to sue on the theory of the doctrine
of necessaries, rather than upon the promissory note, the cause of action failed. Emanuel, 596
So. 2d at 580 (Houston, J., concurring specially).
181. The dissent would have chosen such a remedy. Emanuel, 596 So. 2d at 580 (Maddox,
J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. LeAnn P. Wheeler, Note, Judicial Dilemma: Extension or Invalidation of Sexually
Discriminatory Classifications, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 128, 142 (1981); see also Anita L. Allen,
Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461,
498-505 (1987).
184. See HOFF, supra note 20, at 31-36 (discussing whether there can be equality among
unequals).
185. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
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butions of either spouse. 8 6 This approach recognizes the freedom of
the husband and wife to structure their own financial arrangements1
8 7
and allocations of household and income-generating work. A gender-
neutral application would placate fears of disturbing marital felicity
because neither spouse would bear the brunt of sole support. This
approach would validate the economic reality of a given situation
rather than apply a rigid test which may be ill-suited to the couple's
support arrangements.
Furthermore, creditors would more likely extend credit when
they are assured recourse from resources of either husband or wife
and do not need to worry about which spouse, in fact, has the obliga-
tion to pay.' This alternative would also ensure that a spouse who
has the financial means to pay but refuses to do so would not be able
to unjustly avoid liability to creditors.'89
Some states have modified the doctrine of necessaries to make the
husband primarily liable and the wife secondarily liable.' 90 The pro-
ponents of this approach say that it comports with the economic real-
ity that women typically do not contribute an equal amount of income
to the household. Women are not represented in the workforce to the
same degree as men and those women who are in the work force do
not earn as much as men.' 9' Courts that fashion the doctrine of
necessaries along primary/secondary liability lines hesitate to extend
liability to apply to both spouses equally until both spouses contribute
to household income equally. Other courts have imposed primary lia-
bility on the spouse who incurred the necessary expense and secon-
186. If the judicial proceeding to determine the relative contributions of either spouse to the
family income revealed that neither spouse had the ability to pay a judgment, the liability
could be discharged in the same proceeding. See Toews, supra note 27, at 426.
187. See, e.g., William J. Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources
and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 58-80
(1990) (arguing that developments in the concept of the marriage as contract and abolition of
gender-linked content in the roles that the law proscribes for women pressures courts to
recognize agreements between spouses as enforceable contracts).
188. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Wis. 1982); see also Toews, supra
note 27.
189. Women who contribute to the household income should have a proportionate financial
responsibility for expenses. Denial of equal responsibility actually infringes upon women's
rights. For example, laws excusing women from jury duty on grounds not available to men
and denying women the right to sit on parole boards have been devised by states to "protect"
women. These "protections" for women reinforce the stereotype of women as fragile and more
properly belonging to the domestic sphere. See DECROW, supra note 141, at 36-37.
190. See, e.g., Medical Serv. Ass'n v. Perry, 819 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Marshfield, 314 N.W.2d 326. But see Mahoney, supra note 29 (arguing that this application of
the doctrine of necessaries is unconstitutional).
191. Marshfield, 314 N.W.2d at 329-31; see also Toews, supra note 27, at 425.
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dary liability on the spouse who did not. 192 This approach has a less
gender-discriminatory effect than that which always allocates liability
along gender-role lines, but is problematic because it may discourage
a spouse from incurring "necessary" debts, especially those items
from which he or she would not personally benefit, such as child care
costs. This increased incentive to neglect basic responsibilities in the
household flies in the face of the policy rationale behind the doctrine
of necessaries.
Extending the doctrine, some argue, creates a problem of over-
breadth. In actuality, the doctrine as it exists today is overbroad. As
the doctrine currently applies in Florida, all men, whether financially
secure or not, are liable for the debts of their wives. By extending the
liability to women as equal partners with their husbands in the mar-
riage, the doctrine would lose its overbroad aspect, would be tailored
to the varying individual needs of couples and serve to protect the
financially insecure spouse without reference to that person's gender.
By pinning the role of the woman under the law to a functional evalu-
ation193 rather than societal expectations encoded in long-standing
traditions based on birthright, the protective rationale of the doctrine
of necessaries is maintained, while the irrationality of protecting only
women is removed.
3. SUMMARY
State legislatures have largely ignored the courts' calls to con-
sider the current viability of the doctrine of necessaries in light of
societal needs and the doctrine's utility as a support mechanism. The
Florida legislature was not prompted to act by either the affirmative
modifications of the doctrine by the Parkway and Manatee courts nor
by the Shands court's reminder to the legislature of its potential role
in modifying the doctrine. 194
192. See, e.g., Webb v. Hillsborough County Hosp. Auth., 521 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA
1988); North Shore Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Angrand, 527 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
193. The Supreme Court adopted such a functional evaluation in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1974). The Weinberger court examined a provision of the Social Security Act
that awarded benefits to widows and surviving minor children in cases when the husband had
died, but granted benefits to only the minor children, excluding the widower, in cases where
the wife had died. The Court, in finding this difference unconstitutional, buttressed its
argument with a report which, while recognizing the statistical difference between the roles
played by the sexes in society, proposed that the optimal means of achieving a socially
desirable ends is to "tailor any subsidy directly to the end desired, not indirectly and unequally
[for example,] by helping widows with dependent children and ignoring widowers in the same
plight. In this example, it is the economic and functional capability ... [that] counts." Id. at
652 n. 19 (quoting from the Report of the Comm'n on Railroad Retirement System-Its Coming
Crisis, H.R. Doc. No. 92-350, p. 378 (1972)).
194. See infra part III.B.
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Abolition does not follow from existing legislation which places
equal duties of maintenance and support upon both husbands and
wives. 95 Opponents of abolition of the doctrine argue that holding
each spouse financially independent of the other ignores the concept
of the married couple as a financial unit and leaves creditors of a
financially dependent spouse without recourse. 196 Supporters respond
that abolishing, rather than extending the doctrine, avoids creating a
new liability for the wife. It also relieves the husband of the burden of
the exclusive obligation of support. However, these goals can be
served through a gender-neutral extension of the doctrine.
V. MARRIAGE AS A PARTNERSHIP OF EQUALS
Today, there is a trend throughout the United States towards
viewing marriage as a partnership of equals. 97 Florida already
accepts this view.19a
The fact that in one marital venture a spouse is gainfully employed
in the marketplace and pays a housekeeper to rear the children and
keep house is not distinguishable from the spouse who devoted his
or her full time to the profession of homemaker. The primary fac-
tual circumstance is each spouse's contribution to the marital
partnership. 99
This notion of equality informs Florida courts when considering the
relative contributions of both spouses to the marital partnership upon
dissolution of marriage.2"' The factual circumstances of the partners'
195. See supra note 28.
196. Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (N.J.
1980). The Jersey Shore court further argued that "[i]n a viable marriage, husbands and wives
ordinarily do not distinguish their financial obligations on the basis of which one incurred the
debt. Consequently, literal application of the Married Woman's Act would not comport with
the expectations of husbands, wives, or their creditors." Id.
197. See MAX RHEINSTEIN & MARY A. GLENDON, Interspousal Relations, in PERSONS
AND FAMILY 1-51 (Aleck Chloros ed., 1980) (this survey of the state of interspousal relations
noted that in the United States, "basically, equality of husband and wife and the
transformation of marriage into a partnership of two individuals of equal rank and dignity has
already been well advanced in practically all states.") Id. at 13; see also Jersey Shore, 417 A.2d
at 1008 ("a modem marriage is a partnership, with neither spouse necessarily dependent
financially on the other.").
A gender-neutral partnership theory of marriage is also reflected in modern divorce law.
Although gender-based expectations informed earlier divorce laws, reformers began in the
1960s to reassess the goals of divorce laws and the adequacy of the then-present laws to meet
those goals. Subsequent statutory changes indicated that bread-winners and home-makers no
longer existed as gender-specific, mutually exclusive groups. See WEITZMAN, supra note 5.
198. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203-04 (Fla. 1980).
199. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The Florida Supreme
Court adopted this view in Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197.
200. See infra notes 213-16.
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contributions to the household should also be applied in doctrine of
necessaries cases. Courts should recognize the marriage as a partner-
ship with contributions from both parties during the marriage, as
courts do when the marriage is being dissolved.
Moreover, courts should use principles traditionally applied in
partnership law when considering the mutual support obligations in
the ongoing marriage. The role of either spouse in the marriage need
not be gender-linked. The focus of a reformulation of the doctrine of
necessaries should be to protect a dependent spouse, whether husband
or wife.2 10 Partnership principles further this goal via gender-neutral
provisions which allow couples to create their own support arrange-
ments without penalization by gender-biased support laws and con-
cerns of creditor expectations.
A. Actual Financial Contribution
This Comment has already suggested that the Florida Supreme
Court should extend the doctrine of necessaries to apply to both
spouses in a gender-neutral manner and consider the factual circum-
stances of each spouse's contribution to the marital partnership.20 2
Such inquiries need not be as complex as is often the case in the law of
alimony. 2 3 The relative financial contributions of each spouse to the
partnership should give the court a workable percentage basis upon
which to allocate liability for the cost of the necessary.
Extending liability to both spouses in the proportion to which
they financially contribute to the marriage furthers the goals of the
doctrine of necessaries without unfairly penalizing spouses because of
their gender or because of the way a couple allocates responsibility for
financial support and household services. Both spouses can enter the
marriage as equals without the constraints of the common law's gen-
der-based approach to liability. Proportional allocation nullifies disin-
centives for responsibility as well. Neither spouse is unfairly
penalized for spending time on non-income producing work (as the
husband is under the current doctrine of necessaries). This helps
ensure that a couple will get the necessary goods and services they
need, while creditors are reassured by the closing of the common law
loophole in those cases where the wife has a financial support role in
the marriage.
201. See Mahoney, supra note 29.
202. See supra part IV.
203. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (1991).
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B. Application of the Principles of Partnership Law
"Spouses may contract to be business partners. But in the
absence of such a contract, spouses are, in a sense, 'partners' in
life. '2 °4 No formal arrangement is required to form a partnership.
Courts look at such factors as sharing in profits and losses, the intent
of the parties, the conduct of the parties toward third parties, and the
rights of the parties on dissolution. °5 Some argue against application
of partnership principles because marriage is not profit-oriented in the
same way as a business.20 6 But a strong economic motive often may
exist in a marriage. 20 7 "[T]hose entering into a marriage partnership
must share not only the benefits and successes of the relationship, but
also the risk of failure and the economic consequences to the parties
of such failure. ' 28  Indeed, when one rejects the idea that the hus-
band can solely dictate the standard of living in the home, it appears
that both spouses have a vested interest in the economic condition and
improvement of the marriage partnership.
1. EQUALITY AND EQUITABILITY
The concepts and language of partnership law already in use by
courts and lawyers ease the transition of the theory into the marital
realm.20 9 The partnership analogy, in the context of marriage, pre-
supposes that both husband and wife contribute equally to the mar-
riage.2  Both husband and wife should have a duty to support the
204. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 45 (1989). But
see Note, supra note 162, at 1792-94 (arguing that the primacy of the individual should
preclude any application of partnership principles to marriage).
205. Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of New Jersey, 44 A.2d 172, 174-
75 (N.J. 1945).
206. Note, supra note 164, at 1793; see also Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 3, 33-35 (1989).
207. Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM
L. REV. 539, 544 (1990).
208. Geddes v. Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
209. See Sally B. Sharp, The Partnership Ideal the Development of Equitable Distribution
in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195 (1987); see also Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin
Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J. 1980) ("The reasonable expectation of
marital partners are that their income and assets are held for the benefit of the marital
partnership and, incidentally, for creditors who provide necessaries for either spouse.").
210. Although contributions may be different in kind, the argument that they are still equal
contributions supports enforcement of premarital and antenuptial agreements regarding
support rights and property division. Lauerman, supra note 128. The Committee on Civil and
Political Rights of the President's Commission on the Status of Women has refused to support
equal sharing of responsibility between the husband and the wife. The Committee
recommends only that:
[tihe husband should continue to have the primary responsibility of the support
of his wife and minor children, but in line with the partnership view of marriage,
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other. The success of the partnership requires sharing and altruism
by both spouses. A mutual duty of support should not be classified as
an additional burden to be imposed on women (which, according to
defenders of the protective rationale, women are incapable of assum-
ing). Rather, this duty of support merely recognizes the ability of
both spouses to contribute as equals, regardless of their form of
contribution.
The application of partnership principles does not require both
husband and wife to contribute equally to the family income or share
equally in responsibility for child care and domestic tasks, etc.211
Each spouse's contribution is presumptively of equal value under the
theory of marriage as an egalitarian partnership.21 2
Upon dissolution of marriage in Florida, the property of the hus-
band and wife is divided equitably.213 Florida courts evaluate the
contributions of each spouse, including time contributed to the mari-
tal household as well as any accumulation of material goods.214 In
determining the proper award, courts consider all relevant circum-
stances to ensure equity and justice between the parties. Florida
courts emphasize that notions of basic fairness rather than the law of
the wife should be given some legal responsibility for sharing in the support of
herself and the children to the extent she has sufficient means to do so.
CCPR 23, quoted in KANOWITZ, supra note 124, at 73.
211. "[I]n the case once described as the typical American marriage ... the parties started
out with little or nothing and approached the marriage as a partnership or joint venture....
[I]mplicit in most such marriages was an understanding that such assets would be shared in
some equitable fashion." Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547, 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
212. Lauerman, supra note 130, at 508 n.59.
213. Thus, under Florida Statutes § 61.075 (1991), the court "shall distribute between the
parties the marital assets and liabilities in such proportions as are equitable, after considering
all relative factors."
214. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged in 1975 that the earnings of both
spouses were vital to the family's support, holding that an "archaic and overbroad" gender-
based distinction in Social Security survivor benefits was unconstitutional. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
Florida Statutes § 61.075 (1991) provides in pertinent part:
(1) [T]he court shall set apart to each spouse that spouse's nonmarital assets and liabilities
and shall distribute between the parties the marital assets and liabilities in such proportions as
are equitable, after considering all relevant factors, including:
(a) The contribution to the marriage by each spouse, including contributions to the care
and education of the children and services as a homemaker.
(b) The economic circumstances of the parties.
(e) The contribution of one spouse to the personal career or educational opportunity of
the other spouse.
(g) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement, and production of
income or the improvement of, or the incurring of liabilities to, both the marital assets and the
nonmarital assets of the parties.
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community property govern determinations of how to allocate marital
assets.215
On the basis of education, training, and personality, the parties
are not "equals" in the marriage. 2 6 The goal, however, is equity, not
equality. The wife's role in the marriage entails duties as a partner in
an ongoing entity, yet she also strives for greater personal freedom
and self-determination.
2. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
The policies underlying the Uniform Partnership Act carry over
into the framework of marital law. U.P.A. section 9(1) provides:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner, including the execution in
the partnership name of any instrument for apparently carrying on
in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a
member, binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter,
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact
that he has no such authority.
Application of such principles to the doctrine of necessaries cases
binds the couple for necessary expenses incurred by either. A wife
with assets could not evade liability. Unlike the primary/secondary
liability theory which imposes liability according to which spouse
incurs the expense, this gender-neutral approach does not discourage
either spouse from procuring the "necessary."
If creditors use the gender-neutral principles in section 9(1),
wives would not experience the same problems they historically have
had in obtaining credit without their husbands' assistance. The sec-
tion allows each partner to obtain goods and services in order to carry
215. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); accord Dewberry v.
Dewberry, 455 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); McSwigan v. McSwigan 450 So. 2d 284 (Fla.
4th DCA 1984).
216. Dewberry, 455 So. 2d at 422.
The relative "inequality" of each spouse in the marriage are recognized in the alimony
provisions of Florida Statutes § 61.08 (1991):
(2) . . . [T]he court shall consider ...
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party....
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career
building of the other party.
(g) All sources of income available to either party.
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on the usual business of the partnership. In the marital domain, this
translates into the equal ability of either husband or wife to obtain
goods or services, especially those necessary for the basic support and
maintenance of the family.
Additionally, the Uniform Partnership Act provides that every
partner is accountable as a fiduciary who "must account to the part-
nership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived
•.. without the consent of the other partner[] .... 1"7 The partners'
rights and duties include receiving agreed shares of the profits of the
partnership and sharing the losses of the partnership.2 m8 Courts
should apply these principles while the marriage remains an active
entity, as opposed to their application to the marriage only upon dis-
solution.219 The Florida courts need to apply these principles while
the marriage continues in order to give the fullest credence to the
notion of husbands and wives as equals in the marriage with mutual
duties and rights of support.
3. DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH AND LOYALTY
It is not enough that courts utilize the rhetoric of partnership in
considering the rights and obligations of husbands and wives. Fiduci-
ary principles, as well as obligations of loyalty and good faith, should
apply to the relationship. "While a marital relationship remains in a
non-adversarial stance, each party has fiduciary-like responsibility to
the other. '220  The classic definition of the fiduciary responsibility,
that of "honesty ... [and] the punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive" 221 informs the moral obligation that courts should apply to the
marriage partnership when considering the mutual provisions of sup-
port. Partners should be free to develop their own support arrange-
ments, but in the absence of such contracts, both should support each
other to the extent of their share of financial contribution to the mar-
riage. Wives should not be able to use the doctrine of necessaries to
217. Uniform Partnership Act § 21; see also Draft Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 404
(c)(l) (Draft March, 1992).
218. Uniform Partnership Act § 18 (a).
219. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
220. Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In Baker. the court held
that the property settlement agreement was fraudulent and deceptive. The husband's personal
financial statement breached the "fiduciary responsibilities inherent in the marital
relationship." Id.; see also Fleming v. Fleming, 474 So. 2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Quinn
v. Phipps, 113 So. 419 (Fla. 1927) ("[A] fiduciary relation . . . need not be legal; [it] may be
moral, social, domestic or personal. If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the
parties (that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the
other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused), that is sufficient." Id. at 421
(quoting Beach v. Wilton, 91 N.E. 492 (Il1. 1910)).
221. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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avoid expenses that they are able to pay. Husbands should not dictate
the standard of living and thus unilaterally define necessary
expenses.222
Courts also should impose duties of loyalty and good faith to
both spouses and replace the paternalistic language of husband as
head of household and sole provider for his weak and servile wife.221
The traditional doctrine of necessaries allowed spouses to make
choices that worked plainly to the benefit of one spouse and to the
detriment of the other. Good faith and fair dealing avoid these
choices. Under a revised doctrine of necessaries, both spouses should
share in both the benefits and the burdens of the marriage. Equalizing
responsibility reinforces recognition of the ability of both husband
and wife to contribute, recognizes the worth of the traditionally
under-valued "non-economic" work of the homemaker,224 and dis-
courages acts by the spouses which would needlessly tax the resources
of the partnership.225
VI. CONCLUSION
The district courts of appeal in Florida could not agree upon an
application of the doctrine of necessaries before the Shands decision
and have re-divided over interpretation of the doctrine since then.
The crux of the problem is that the current role of women in society
conflicts with the principles which informed the doctrine of neces-
saries at common law. Equal protection of the law demands that one
spouse should not be liable for necessary debts where the other spouse
is not. The broad application of the doctrine of necessaries may have
222. See supra note 129.
223. In 1948, the Florida Supreme Court observed:
[T]he wife who is tactless enough to prefer the company of others to that of her
husband, and gets more joy form her job than she does from the whoop of
children, the romance of sewing on buttons and darning socks, is minus what it
takes to make the home aglow with domestic felicity.
Chestnut v. Chestnut, 33 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1948). Forty years later, a Florida court
commented:
We have come a long way since a wife was considered little more than the hus-
band's property and completely dependent upon him for support. We have even
come a long way from the time a woman, while not considered property, was
treated as a second rate citizen in terms of full participatory rights in our society.
Geddes v. Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011, 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
224. See Sharp, supra note 209, at 199.
225. Some argue that it is unfair to make both spouses liable for debts without giving equal
right to share in family income or assets. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W. 2d 326, 338
(Wis. 1982); see also Note, supra note 164. But extending each spouse's liability only to the
proportion of financial contribution each makes to the marriage partnership does not unfairly
burden the assets of either spouse, even where there is no recognized right to share income or
assets.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
seemed appropriate when men had exclusive domain of the economic
realm, but no more. Marriage is a partnership of equals who make
equal contributions, though different in kind, to the marriage. The
doctrine of necessaries still has a place in the law as a support remedy,
but should be extended to both spouses, in accordance with their pro-
portion of financial contribution to the marriage partnership. This
application would promote the original goals of the doctrine of neces-
saries, recognize the modem role of women in society, and provide a
measure of certainty in application for all concerned. The Florida
Supreme Court cannot ignore its legitimate role in constitutional con-




226. Petitioners' Amended Brief on Jurisdiction at 9, Waite v. Leesburg Regional Medical
Ctr., Inc., 582 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (No. 90-02163).
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